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The Role of Land Retirement Programs for Management of Water Resources 
1. Introduction 
   The water resources of the Eastern Snake River Plain Aquifer (ESPA) are at the forefront 
of the water shortages and dispute in Idaho. The ESPA is the single-most important aquifer in 
Idaho. Irrigation practices and reduced reliance on surface water diversions have decreased the 
spring  discharge  and  groundwater  levels  in  the  ESPA.  Increased  pumping  withdrawals  and 
reduced seepage from surface water as a result of conversions from surface to sprinkler irrigation 
have led to a short fall of about 900,000 acre feet recharge every year to the aquifer. In Magic 
Valley alone, about 1,300 farmers received notice to shut down their pumps, and 113,000 acres 
kept idle (IGWA, 2004). Finding solution to Idaho’s water management problems is critical to 
the  sustainability  of  agriculture,  livestock,  and  aquaculture  sectors  in  Idaho.  These  sectors 
provide many local jobs and contribute significantly to the Idaho’s economy. Since they heavily 
rely  on  surface  and  groundwater,  their  long-term  viability  depends  on  the  sustainable 
management of water resources. In particular, serious threat of decline in the groundwater table 
calls for the management of water resources such that there is a favorable balance between the 
economic development and environment.  
In  order  to  find  short-term  and  long-term  solutions  to  Idaho’s  water  supply  and 
management  problems,  various  public  policy  proposals  have  been  introduced.  For  example, 
shutting down thousands of groundwater pumps that reduce the flows of springs from the ESPA 
has been considered. Another proposal considered by Idaho legislators has focused on curtailing 
junior-right water users. This proposal aims at changing the ESPA water budget by 600,000 to 
900,000 acre feet annually (Legislative Perspective, 2004). It will cost about $80 to $100 million 
over 30 years and pay willing farmers and business owners to give up their water rights (IGWA, PRELIMINARY VERSION – PLEASE DO NOT CITE 
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2004). Since curtailment of some groundwater pumping is considered as the part of solution, the 
federal  Conservation  Reserve  Enhancement  Program  (CREP)  has  been  proposed  to  make 
curtailment voluntary. This program would pay annual rental payments to eligible farmers in 
order to take up to 100,000 acres of land out of production. 
Several  studies  have  examined  the  efficient  allocation  of  groundwater  (Brown  and 
Deacon, 1972; Allen and Gisser, 1984; Feinerman and Knapp, 1983; Roseta-Palma, 2003; Kim 
et al., 1989; Rubio and Casino, 2003). These studies suggest various policies to achieve the 
desired  socially  optimal  extraction.  Policy  recommendations  include  taxes,  quotas,  subsidies, 
tradable  permits,  and  standards.  Although  it  is  theoretically  easy  to  determine  optimal 
taxes/subsidies,  various  problems  are  associated  with  implementations  such  as  monitoring, 
heterogeneity in farmer characteristics, high transaction costs, and varying tax/subsidy rates over 
time  to  reflect  increasing  scarcity  (Hellegers  and  Ierland,  2003;  Roseta-Palma,  2002,  2003). 
Thus, there is a need to develop alternative policies and programs that are easy to implement and 
can avoid many of the problems associated with the market-based policies considered above. An 
example of such a policy that has been recommended for reducing water use from the agriculture 
is the voluntary land retirement program. 
There has been relatively little attention given to the effectiveness and implications of 
voluntary land retirement programs as a policy option to manage groundwater. It is important to 
understand the extent to which land retirement programs are cost-effective in achieving the water 
allocation  goals.  Although  several  studies  examined  the  cost-effective  targeting  of  the 
Conservation  Reserve  Program  (Babcock  et  al.,  1996,  1997;  Ribaudo,  1986,  1989)  and  the 
Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (Khanna et al., 2004; Yang et al., 2005; Yang and PRELIMINARY VERSION – PLEASE DO NOT CITE 
  3 
Isik, 2004) for non-point source pollution control, there is currently no study examining the 
implications of land retirement programs for achieving water quantity goals.  
The purpose of this paper is to develop  a model of water resource management that 
incorporates heterogeneity in farmer characteristics to analyze the socially optimal management 
of groundwater allocation with a land retirement program. First, we formulate an optimal control 
problem that determines the socially optimal water use and land allocations among alternative 
crops and compare those to the privately optimal solutions. Second, we introduce an optimal 
control  problem  of  a  least-cost  land  retirement  program  that  achieves  a  given  level  of 
groundwater  stock  to  examine  the  implications  of  land  retirement  programs  and  their  cost-
effectiveness in achieving the optimal water allocations. The developed model is empirically 
applied to the ESPA. 
This  study  contributes  to  the  existing  literature  on  the  management  of  groundwater 
resources as well as the design and implementation of alternative land retirement policies. It 
incorporates heterogeneity in resource users in terms of soil characteristics, productivity, costs of 
production,  water  use,  land  availability,  and  crops  produced  in  modeling  groundwater 
extractions. Most existing studies of groundwater management (e.g., Roseta-Palma, 2002, 2003; 
Qiuqiong and Scott, 2004) fail to capture this heterogeneity among farmers. We also provide 
implications of land retirement programs for the water resource management by developing an 
optimal control model. This is the first investigation of land retirement programs for achieving 
water quantity goals. The framework developed in this paper can be applied to other regions and 
water conflicts to analyze the implications of various public policies for finding solutions to 
water management problems. The results from this paper have important implications for the 
design and implementations of alternative policies for the management of scarce water resources. PRELIMINARY VERSION – PLEASE DO NOT CITE 
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2. Theoretical Model  
We consider an aquifer serving as a source of groundwater for irrigation to M farmers 
with  i A  acreage producing j crops. The per-acre groundwater extracted by farmer i at time t is 
denoted as  ijt g . The pumping lift,  i d , is defined as the initial distance from the surface to the 
water level. It varies across heterogeneous farmers for a given level of groundwater stock  t G . 
The cost of groundwater extraction,  ) , ( i t d G C , depends on the groundwater stock and pumping 
lift.  It  is  assumed  to  be  convex  in  t G   ( 0 < G C   and  0 > GG C ).  Let  i z   represent  the  soil 
characteristics. The production function depends on the applied water ( ijt g ), water-use efficiency 













use efficiency defines the fraction of the water that is actually utilized by a crop. The product 
ijt ig a  represents the amount of applied water that is effectively used (Caswell et al., 1990). 
The  differential  equation  describing  the  groundwater  dynamics  is  the  net  gain  to  the 
aquifer, provided that the natural recharge (R) is higher than the total extraction: 
￿ + - =
j i




a .                                                                            (1) 
The per-acre profit of farmer i at time t for crop j is given by 
ijt i t ijt j ijt g d G C y P ) , ( - = p                                               (2) 
where  j P   is  the  output  price.  Let  ijt A   be  the  acreage  to  be  allocated  to  crop  j  such  that 
i
j
ijt A A £ ￿ .   
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The water planner’s problem is to maximize the net present value of the total profits in 
the region subject to equation (1) and  i
j
ijt A A £ ￿  in order to determine the optimal water use and 
land allocations among crops as: 
[ ]dt g d G C Py A e
N
j i
ijt i t ijt ijt
t
A g ijt ijt ￿￿ -
-
0 ,
, ) , ( max
r
                                       (3) 
where  r  is the discount rate. By augmenting the Hamiltonian, we can write the present-value 
Lagrangian with the information in the inequality constraint as (Chiang, 1992, p. 278): 
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Assuming interior solutions (i.e.,  0 ³ ijt g  and  0 ³ ijt A ), we have the following conditions for the 
maximum principle along with the equation of motion for G in (1): 














p r                                                   (5.a) 









l a l p





















- .                   (5.c) 
Equation (5.a) states that under the social optimality the marginal benefit of groundwater 
use is equal to the marginal cost of groundwater extraction plus the shadow price of effectively 
used groundwater. This shadow price reflects the cost imposed on the future generation by using 
water  now.  Equation  (5.b)  with  1 l   obtained  from  (5.a)  implies  that 
















r r , where  i 2 l  is the shadow price of land availability  constraint. 
This indicates that the farmers allocate the land to the crop with the highest ratio of the benefits PRELIMINARY VERSION – PLEASE DO NOT CITE 
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with the crop production to the costs imposed on future water users. Equation (5.c) gives the 
dynamics  of  shadow  price  of  the  groundwater  stock.  The  steady-state  total  extraction  and 
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Under  the  private  optimal  solution,  the  farmers  maximize  the  expected  profits  and 
determine  the  groundwater  use  such  that  the  marginal  benefit  of  the  water  use  equals  the 
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P ).  The  farmers  do  not  take  into  account  the 
additional cost of groundwater use, namely the cost imposed on the future water use. Thus, the 
optimal water use under the private optimality is higher than the social optimality. Under the 





r . This implies 
that the farmers allocate the land to the crop with the highest profit. 
Land Retirement Programs for Managing Groundwater  
We  now  develop  a  least-cost  land  retirement  policy  to  achieve  a  given  level  of 
groundwater stock. We consider a policy that targets achieving a given level of stock (G ) in N 
years.  We  define  it L   as  the  acreage  to  be  retired  from  farmer  i  at  year  t  such  that 
i it
j
ijt A L A £ + ￿ ) ( . Since the retired land may not be brought back to the production, we define a 
new state variable  it G  as the size of the parcel that is available for the land retirement at time t. 






, with  i i A = G 0 . This indicates that the amount of 
land available over time decreases by  it L .  PRELIMINARY VERSION – PLEASE DO NOT CITE 
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The water planner’s problem is: 
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it it L G £                                                       (10) 
G GN = .                          (11) 
Equation (8) is the total land availability constraint for each farmer. The dynamics of the land 
available for retirement and the constraint on the maximum amount of land that can be retired 
over time are given by equations (9) and (10), respectively. The target groundwater stock to be 
achieved  in  N  years  is  given  by  equation  (11).  Augmenting  the  Hamiltonian  leads  to  the 
following Lagrangian with the inequality constraint (Chiang, 1992, p. 278): 
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We obtain the following conditions for the maximum principle along with the equation of motion 
for G in (7): 
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Equation (12.a) defines the optimal water use for each farmer. Equation (13.a) describes 
the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the optimal land allocation  ijt A . The optimal land retirement is 
determined from equation (13.b). Using equations (13.a) and (13.c), we can find out the factors 
affecting  the  choice  of  land  parcel  for  retirement.  Farmer  i’s  land  is  retired  if     
0 4 3 2 1 ³ - - - + -
-
i i i ijt i
t
ijt g e l l l a l p
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r r .  This  also 
implies that the land parcel with the highest benefit to cost ratio,  ( ) ( )
t
ijt ijt i e g
r p a l
- / 1 , would be 
selected  first  for  the  land  retirement.  This  model  describes  the  optimal  targeting  of  land 
retirement to achieve the water quantity goal. It requires a rental payment of at least  ijt p  at time t 
in order to induce farmers to participate in the program. 
An alternative land retirement program is to take a given number of acres (L ) out of 
production in N years. Under such a policy, the water planner’s decision problem is similar to the 




it L dt L
0
. The goal of this policy is to retire  L  acres with least cost. This policy does not 
consider where the land parcels to be retired are located and therefore ignore their contributions PRELIMINARY VERSION – PLEASE DO NOT CITE 
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to the water degradation in the aquifer. Following the same approach used above, the conditions 
for the maximum principle can be easily obtained. 
We now describe a uniform land retirement strategy that offers a uniform rental rate (R) 
for all the eligible farmers in the region. Under such a strategy, all the farmers with  R ijt £ p  will 
participate in the program. The uniform policy is commonly implemented because it is easier to 
put into practice due to less information requirements. However, this policy may not be cost-
effective because it does not target farmers with higher benefit (reduction in water use) to cost 
(rental payment) ratio. Given the expected profits of each farmer under the private optimality, we 
can determine the uniform rental rate (R) required to achieve a given number of acres retired (L ) 
in the region. The effectiveness of the uniform policy for water resource management in terms of 
the cost and water-use reduction is an empirical question. In the next section, we develop an 
empirical model to analyze the implications of alternative policies for the management of water 
resources in the ESPA.  
3. Empirical Application and Data 
The developed model is empirically applied to the ESPA in southern Idaho. We calibrate 
our theoretical model to the hydrological and soil conditions in the ESPA. The Eastern Snake 
River Plain extends as a two hundred mile long arc, about 60 miles in width, across southeast 
Idaho.  Composed  of  layered  basalt  lava  flows  and  some  sediment,  it  covers  an  area  of 
approximately  10,800  square  mile  across  16  counties  (Cosgrove  et  al.,  1999;  Johnson  and 
Cosgrove, 1999). The aquifer is semi-confined of about 4,000 feet thick at the center of the 
Snake River plain. It annually supplies about 40,000 acre feet of water for drinking and two 
million acre feet of water for irrigation and industry (INEEL, 2002). The ESPA is the only 
source of drinking water for most of the people in southeast Idaho. The ESPA is drained by the PRELIMINARY VERSION – PLEASE DO NOT CITE 
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Snake River and its tributaries. Total groundwater storage in the upper 500 feet of the aquifer is 
estimated at about 200 to 300 million acre-feet (Cosgrove et al., 1999). In most parts of the 
ESPA, rainfall is insufficient to support commercial levels of agriculture without irrigation.  
We define 667 representative farms in 16 counties, with the irrigated and non-irrigated 
land acreage specified for each farm. These representative farms are determined based on their 
soil characteristics, location, and sources of water used. The soil maps of each farm in each 
county are obtained to determine yields of various crops depending on the soil characteristics 
(NRCS,  2005).  The  information  on  crop-specific  variable  costs  such  as  inputs,  planting  and 
harvesting were obtained from the University of Idaho Crop Budgets (2003). The input costs 
include seed, fertilizers, labor, pesticides, and other production inputs. Using the crop yields, 
production  costs  and  output  prices,  we  generate  crop-specific  crop  budgets  for  each 
representative farm.  
The irrigation water used in agriculture in the ESPA comes from both the groundwater 
and  surface  water  sources.  The  use  of  surface  water  in  irrigation  is  the  main  source  of  the 
recharge in the aquifer. The empirical model considers the sources of water available in each 
county. Our model also distinguishes between irrigated and non-irrigated crop productions in the 
ESPA.  In some parts of the ESPA, there is currently a small amount of non-irrigated crops 
acreage. The empirical model will allow farmers to switch to non-irrigated crops in response to 
the various public policy proposals in these areas. The major crops grown in the region include 
potatoes, wheat, barley, alfalfa, sugar beets, corn grain, corn silage, and dry edible beans. We 
define over 72 different crop rotations, with rotations ranging from 2 to 7 years. These rotations 
incorporate agronomic constraints and include many commonly used rotation practices in the 
ESPA. Some of the examples of these rotation practices are two-year grains followed by one-PRELIMINARY VERSION – PLEASE DO NOT CITE 
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year  potatoes,  four-year  grains  followed  by  one-year  sugar  beets,  and  grains  or  beans  with 
alfalfa. 
The per-acre crop yield is assumed to be represented by a quadratic function as: 
( ) ( )
2
2 1 0 ij i j ij i j j ij w w y a f a f f + + = .                                                                (14) 
The parameters of the production function for all the crops considered in this study are calculated 
from  the  data  representing  the  crop  production  in  the  ESPA.  The  University  of  Idaho  crop 
budgets were used to determine the parameters of the production function (University of Idaho 
Crop Budgets, 2003). The information about the irrigation water requirements for various crops 
was obtained from the study by Allen and Brockway (1983). We assume that (a) there is no yield 
when the consumptive water use is zero for potatoes, sugar beets, corn grain, corn silage, and dry 
edible beans (i.e.,  0 0 = j f ), (b) a maximum yield can be obtained with a given effective annual 
water use, and (c) the yield curve is a symmetric quadratic function so that the production is zero 
at  twice  the  effective  water  use.  Since  wheat,  barley,  and  alfalfa  can  be  produced  without 
irrigation water in some parts of the ESPA, the coefficients  j 0 f  for these crops represent the 
yields that can be obtained without applying water.  
We assume that the efficiency of water use ( i a ) is a function of technology choice and 
land quality represented by an index  i d . Using the data from NRCS (2005), we generate a soil 
quality index and determine the distribution of soil quality for the entire region. The soil quality 
index  i d  is then scaled to correspond to the water use efficiency with the traditional technology 
(i.e.,  i i d a = 1 ) and can assume values from 0 to 1. In the region, the farmers use both the furrow 
technology and the sprinkler technology. When the efficiency of water use with the traditional 
furrow technology is 0.60, the adoption of a sprinkler irrigation system increases efficiency of PRELIMINARY VERSION – PLEASE DO NOT CITE 
  12 
water use to 0.85 (Neibling, 1998). We use this information to calibrate a constant elasticity 
function to relate the efficiency with the furrow irrigation to that with the sprinkler irrigation as 
318 . 0
2 i i d a = .  
In the empirical application, we focus on the implications of land retirement programs for 
a given year, rather than determining the time paths of cropland to be retired. We assume that the 
water  planner’s  problem  is  to  achieve  the  water  quantity  goal  in  one  year  (i.e.,  N=1  in  the 
theoretical model). We solve the decision problem in a two-stage framework. We first determine 
the optimal groundwater use for each farmer. We then determine the optimal allocations of land 
among various crops and analyze the implications of land retirement programs.  
4. Results 
  We first determine the optimal cropping and rotation practices in the region to provide 
the base model results. This model maximizes the total returns in the region subject to the land 
availability constraint for each farm to determine the optimal cropping and rotation practices as 
well as the optimal water use for each farm. The results from this model will be compared to the 
land retirement policies to be developed below. Table 1 summarizes the acreage allocated to the 
irrigated and non-irrigated crops in each county in the ESPA. The farm-level rotation practices 
are aggregated to obtain the county-level land allocated to the irrigated and non-irrigated crops. 
The common optimal rotation practices followed by the representative farms with the rotations 
ranging  from  2  to  7  years  include  alfalfa/potatoes/corn  silage/wheat  or  barley, 
alfalfa/potatoes/wheat/barley,  barley/wheat/potatoes,  corn  silage/wheat/potatoes,  wheat/barley 
barley/corn/potatoes, barley/potatoes/beans, and wheat/alfalfa/barley. The total land allocated to 
the irrigated and non-irrigated crops are close to the actual land use in 2002. Thus, our base 
model replicates the existing farming conditions in the ESPA very well.   PRELIMINARY VERSION – PLEASE DO NOT CITE 
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Alternative Land Retirement Programs 
  Table 2 presents the results of three alternative land-retirement programs; the uniform 
land retirement policy, the least-cost land retirement program with the acreage goal, and the 
program that reduces the total water use by 10%. The uniform land retirement policy examines 
the implications of a uniformly offered rental payments to all the eligible farmers in the region. 
This program is usually implemented with a bidding cap. For example, a soil-based bid cap is set 
at the county level in the Conservation Reserve Program. We consider a policy that offers a 
uniform rental rate to all the eligible farmers in order to retire 100,000 acres irrigated cropland. 
This target land is chosen because the current policy proposal aims at retiring 100,000 acres of 
cropland out of production in the ESPA. Non-irrigated land is not eligible for participation in the 
program. Under such a program, all the farmers with the expected profits from crop production 
less than the uniform rental rate will participate in the program. All the participating farmers will 
receive the same rental rate regardless of their productivity or water use in the region. We build a 
heuristic procedure to determine the uniform bid cap that would induce 100,000 acres irrigated 
cropland retirement. First, a low bid cap (rental rate) is set, land parcels with the expected profits 
below the bid cap are selected, and the total acreage enrolled is calculated. The rental rate is then 
increased by small increments until the acreage goal in the region is achieved. The uniform rental 
rate is found to be $147/acre. The farmers taking their land out of production are located in five 
counties, namely Blaine, Butte, Clark, Gooding, and Lincoln.  
Under  the  least-cost  land-restriction  model,  the  objective  is  to  retire  100,000  acres 
irrigated croplands with least cost. This program minimizes the total rental payments given to the 
farmers subject to the target land area. The rental payments are equal to the per-acre expected 
profits from crop production determined with the base model. With the least-cost land retirement PRELIMINARY VERSION – PLEASE DO NOT CITE 
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program, the same counties under the uniform policy are chosen to retire cropland. However, the 
average rental payment is $88/acre, which is much lower than that of the uniform policy. The 
uniform policy costs more than 65% compared to the least-cost land retirement program. Thus, 
targeting will significantly reduce the total rental payments made to the farmers in achieving the 
land retirement goal. 
  We also examine the implications of a policy that reduce the total water use by 10% with 
the  least-cost  land  retirement  program  in  the  region.  This  model  minimizes  the  cost  of  the 
program in terms of the total rental payments provided to the farmers in order to achieve the 10% 
water-use reduction goal as compared to the baseline. The results indicate that 212,142 acres 
need to be retired in order to achieve the 10% reduction in the total water use in the ESPA. The 
average rental payment is found to be about $143/acre. These results indicate that increased 
water-use reduction goal requires retiring more productive croplands out of production, which 
leads to an increase in the rental payments. 
To examine the cost-effectiveness of the least-cost land retirement program, we develop a 
model to achieve the same water reduction provided with the least-cost land-restriction model. 
This model maximizes the total returns in the region subject to the water-use reduction constraint 
to determine the optimal cropping and rotation practices in the region. The model allows the 
flexibility in achieving the water quantity goal by changing cropping and rotation practices and 
allowing  some  land  parcels  to  be  idle.  Under  the  least-cost  land  retirement  model  with  the 
100,000 cropland retirement target, the total water use in the ESPA decreases by 4.62%. With 
this model, no land needs to be idle to achieve the water quantity goal. Changing cropping and 
rotation practices in the region would allow achieving this goal with the least cost. The results 
presented in Table 3 summarize the optimal aggregate cropping practices in 16 counties. As PRELIMINARY VERSION – PLEASE DO NOT CITE 
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compared to the base model results, the total acreage allocated to irrigated crops alfalfa, wheat, 
sugar beets, and corn silage decrease, while the lands under corn, dry edible beans and barley 
increase.  The  changes  in  cropping  and  rotation  practices  lead  to  these  changes  in  the  land 
allocations among crops. 
Implications of Land Retirement Programs 
Table  4  presents  the  implications  of  alternative  land-retirement  policies  for  the  gross 
social welfare, farm income, and water use in the ESPA. The total gross social welfare in the 
region decreases by 1.36% under the uniform strategy and the least-cost land retirement policy 
with the acreage goal, and 4.8% under the least-cost policy with the water-use reduction goal. 
The optimal policy attains the water quantity goal achieved under the land restriction model with 
the costs of about 0.66% of the baseline gross social welfare in the region. The cost of achieving 
the water quantity goal with the least-cost land retirement policy with the acreage goal is about 
$8.1 million, which is about two times higher than the cost of the optimal policy.    
The total farm income from agricultural production plus the rental payments received in 
the region increases by $5.5 million, which is about 0.9% of the base farm income under the 
uniform strategy. With the least-cost land retirement policy with the acreage goal, the total farm 
income with the rental payments included does not change as compared to the baseline. The farm 
income under the optimal policy decreases by 0.66% of the baseline farm income.    
These results suggest that the cost-effectiveness of land retirement programs could be 
improved with targeting the farmers with the highest benefit to cost ratios. The water reduction 
goal of the land  retirement programs can also  be achieved without idling croplands through 
changing cropping and rotation practices. This indicates that conservation programs that focus on 
on-farm conservation of water could be considered as an alternative policy to the land retirement PRELIMINARY VERSION – PLEASE DO NOT CITE 
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programs. Such conservation programs would provide incentives to the farmers to switch to 
crops with less water requirements. 
5. Conclusions 
  This  paper  develops  a  model  of  water  resource  management  to  examine  the  socially 
optimal management of groundwater allocation with a land retirement program. The theoretical 
model formulates an optimal control problem to determine the socially optimal water use and 
land  allocations  among  alternative  crops.  An  optimal  control  problem  of  a  least-cost  land 
retirement  program  that  achieves  a  given  level  of  groundwater  stock  is  also  developed  to 
examine the implications of alternative land retirement programs for achieving the optimal water 
allocations. The developed model is empirically applied to the ESPA in southern Idaho. 
The results show that the alternative land retirement programs have different impacts on 
the  farm  income,  gross  social  welfare,  and  water  use.  Cost-effectiveness  of  land  retirement 
programs in meeting water quantity goals can be improved by targeting farmers with the highest 
benefit (water use) to cost (expected returns from production) ratios. Alternative programs and 
policies  that  focus  on  on-farm  water  conservations  instead  of  idling  croplands  can  also  be 
developed to achieve water quantity goals. These water conservation programs could focus on 
changing cropping and rotation practices in the region so that acreage allocated to crops with 
more intensive water requirements decrease. Environmental and natural resource policies are 
increasingly relying on the use of land retirement and conversion programs to reduce adverse 
impacts of agricultural production practices. These results have important implications for the 
design  and  implementation  of  alternative  land  retirement  programs  for  water  resource 
management. The framework developed in this paper can also be applied to other regions and 
water conflicts in the United States.  PRELIMINARY VERSION – PLEASE DO NOT CITE 
  17 
Table 1. Base Model of Optimal Allocation of Cropping Practices in Southern Idaho (Acres) 
 
  Irrigated Crops  Non-irrigated Crops   
County  Barley  Potatoes  Wheat  Alfalfa  Sugar Beets  Corn Silage  Beans  Corn  Barley  Wheat  Alfalfa  TOTAL 
                         
Bingham    39405  39405  94572  52540  36778      4450  4450    271600 
Blaine  12975  5456  10872  1497          2103    1197  34100 
Bonneville  808  29216  50392  38407    15377      24054  11769  12577  182600 
Butte  17923  7087  17923  1640                44573 
Cassia  63036  37600  31222  55229  31560    5853    10182    10182  244863 
Clark  6900    6900  20700          1187  1187    36874 
Fremont    24080  36992  39128          23683  13308  13308  150500 
Gooding  10760  11639  14912  21443  11946  5800            76500 
Jefferson    29785  47006  73103    41259        5747    196900 
Jerome  27669  20872  19494  41865  23843  2857      650    650  137900 
Lincoln  12714  6671  6276  4617  2572  1614  2103  5932        42500 
Madison    20912  30061  49666          30061      130700 
Minidoka  40710  27409  15604  52595  30054    5829    4250    4250  180700 
Power    23998  29001  33093  16850  11795    2764    16363  21389  155252 
Bannock    8688  13900  9912          6000  7900  7900  54300 
Twin Falls  45399  31146  21516  62927  35958    2854    3050    3050  205900 
TOTAL  238893  323965  391474  600394  205322  115481  16639  8696  109669  60725  74503  2145762 
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Table 2. Alternative Land Retirement Programs  
 
 County  Uniform Strategy  Land Restriction 
Model 
Reduce Water 
Use by 10% 
          
Bingham         
Blaine  8032  8032  8690 
Bonneville          
Butte  26925  26925  44341 
Cassia        13648 
Clark  30051  30051  34500 
Fremont          
Gooding  24097  24097  24097 
Jefferson        1943 
Jerome        13317 
Lincoln  10896  10896  11864 
Madison        4126 
Minidoka        41536 
Power          
Bannock          
Twin Falls        14078 
Total Land Enrolled   100000  100000  212142 
       
Total Rental Payment 
(Million $) 
14.710  8.809  30.290 
Average Rental Payment ($)  147.100  88.092  142.782 PRELIMINARY VERSION – PLEASE DO NOT CITE 
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Table 3. Optimal Allocation of Cropping Practices that Achieve the Same Water Reduction with the Land Restriction Model 
 
  Irrigated Crops  Non-irrigated Crops   




Beans  Corn   Barley  Wheat  Alfalfa  TOTAL 
                         
Bingham    39405  39405  94572  52540  36778      4450  4450    271600 
Blaine  12580  5456  10134  2630          2446    854  34100 
Bonneville  3088  29216  51724  22104    28068      14187  12557  21656  182600 
Butte  17923  7087  17923  1640                44573 
Cassia  74723  38131  17637  36636  20935    36438    10182    10182  244863 
Clark  4422    4422  13266          7382  7382    36874 
Fremont    24080  38677  26319          15930  22747  22747  150500 
Gooding  10873  11644  15076  21263  11843  5800            76500 
Jefferson    30976  45815  74294    12684        33132    196900 
Jerome  29134  20938  17403  39534  22511  2857  4222    650    650  137900 
Lincoln  16617  6773  665  965  537  492  3902  12549        42500 
Madison    20912  30061  49666          30061      130700 
Minidoka  47261  27707  12626  42172  24098    18336    4250    4250  180700 
Power    25246  31841  30991  15682  10977    2764    16363  21389  155252 
Bannock    8688  13900  9912          6000  7900  7900  54300 
Twin Falls  48597  31291  20062  57839  33051    8959    3050    3050  205900 
TOTAL  265217  327551  367371  523804  181197  97657  71857  15313  98586  104532  92678  2145762 
Change Compared  
to Base Model (%) 
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Table 4. Comparison of Alternative Land Retirement Policies with the Optimal Policy  
 












           
Total Water Use (Million 
Acre/Feet) 
5.049  4.814  4.814  4.591  4.814 
Reduction in Water Use 
(Million Acre/Feet) 








Reduction in Water Use 
(%) 
-  4.88  4.88  10.00  4.88 
           
Farm Income (Million $)  657.498  663.399  657.498  657.498  653.138 
Reduction in Farm Income 
(Million $) 
  -5.901  0  0  4.36 
Reduction in Farm Income 
(%) 
  -0.90  0  0  0.66 
           
Gross Social Welfare 
(Million $) 
657.498  648.689  648.689  627.208  653.138 
Reduction in Gross Social 
Welfare (Million $) 







Reduction in Gross Social 
Welfare (%) 
-  1.34  1.34  4.61  0.66 
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